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Abstract
My final degree paper will investigate the theoretical and practical aspects about voluntary
disclosure.  First  of all,  I  will  compare mandatory and voluntary disclosures.  Giving more
focus to voluntary part I will analyse its effects and consequences on company's performance,
market  position  etc.  Moreover,  this  document  aims  to  study motives  and limitations  that
managers face if they want to share more information than the government is requiring. It will
also analyse different types of disclosure possibilities. In order not to focus only on theoretical
aspects I made an analysis of two companies and the effect of voluntary disclosure on their
stock value. In the last part, the advantages and disadvantages will be discussed. Different
research show, that despite  some negative consequences voluntary disclosure brings more
positive effects and try to encourage the management towards that trend.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The trend towards voluntary disclosure is still not so popular. Managers hesitate either
it  is  better  for the company's  interest  to publish more information than is  required in  the
mandatory statements. Many times they rather play safe, and only share what they have been
asked for. Some of companies try to hide negative information and when the truth comes out
the negative effects are even stronger, than if they decided to disclose it on their own.
Voluntary disclosure is mainly caused by agency problem. Usually, shareholders are
no longer actively involved in company's decisions process. In order to make sure that the
company  will  be  profitable  they  empower  the  management  to  do  so.  At  that  point  the
information  asymmetry problem arises...  Managers  are  better  informed  than stakeholders.
That gap can also lead to lemon problem, where trusted and highly valued company suddenly
looses its value. Another important aspect is cost of capital. The less the market knows about
the company, the harder it will become for management to obtain external financing.
Regarding the information shared, we can point out six different types of voluntary
disclosure:  business  data,  management’s  analysis  of  business  data,  forward-looking
information,  information  about  management  and  shareholders,  background  about  the
company and information  about  intangible  assets.  These  following  types  can  get  usually
divided  into  four  subcategories  regarding  sales,  products,  operations  and  financial
performance.  This  paper  focuses  also  on  motivations  and  limitations  regarding  voluntary
disclosure.  There are  different  factors that convince managers into profitability of sharing
more  information.  On  the  other  hand  we  need  to  face  some  factors  blocking  voluntary
disclosure tendency. 
All of the theoretical part finds its reflection in section five, which concentrates on
practical aspects and cases. Firstly, I point out managers perception about voluntary disclosure
based on Graham's survey. Later on, I move into analysing stock performance of Gowex and
British Petroleum, affected by the level of voluntary disclosure.
The main objective of this paper is to analyse whether voluntary disclosure gives more
advantages or disadvantages to companies. 
2.  AGENCY PROBLEM
In this chapter I will focus on agency problem and discuss three main factors that lead
to  it. Agency  problem  arises  when  shareholders  invest  in  a  company  but  they  are  not
responsible  for  business  decisions.  As  they  are  not  actively  involved  in  a  business  they
empower the management to act in their name, trusting them that taken decisions will be the
best ones.  Information asymmetry,  lemon problem and high cost of capital issues can be
easily reduced if the management decides to voluntarily disclosure more information than is
required by the government. In this chapter I will analyse its consequences and outcomes.
(Healy & Palepu, 2001)
2.1. Information asymmetry
For many years we have been dealing with imbalances within the organization.  The
information  held  inside  the  company is  not  the  same as  the  information  available  to  its
stakeholders. We need to consider the agency problem... information asymmetry. This concept
is quite simple. One party has more information (managers) than the other one (stakeholders).
(Healy  &  Palepu,  2001).  Why  does  it  appear?  Wouldn't it  be  better  if  all  the  gathered
information would be publicly available to everyone? Wouldn't it make the stakeholders trust
the management more, and be better prepared for their future actions. What are its outcomes
and consequences? How could the information asymmetry get reduced?
The answer to those questions is not that simple and each of them has its advantages
and disadvantages. First of all, the information asymmetry is what gives us the power in the
market. If one knows more than the other it is more probable that he will make a better deal. It
is basically, the inequality between the seller and the buyer. We could transform it into the
capital markets, where the buyer would be the investor and the seller is the company in which
he is planning to invest in. Obviously, the management of the company knows, or at least is
supposed to  know, every little  detail  regarding the companies  condition,  future plans  and
benefits. This type of inside information is not available to the investor. The only formal and
legal information he gets is the one from public statements, the information required by the
government  and  the  information  the  company  decides  to  share  publicly.  (Bagherpour  &
ArabSalehi, 2008; Petrova et. al. 2012)
Does it make him a looser? Not necessary... Although, let's be honest, he is starting
from the loosing position it does not necessaries imply that he will loose. 
First of all, the inside information held by the company, does not have to have a high
value. As long as it does not bring anything surprising this information is basically what the
company  has  been  collecting  in  order  to  make  correctly  their  financial  statements  etc.
Therefore, weather the investor knows it or not, it does not really affect his perception of
viewing the investment.  Secondly, the companies value might be underestimated. It can be
caused by many different factors. The company might not know its real value, be in an urgent
need of liquidity, similar company has failed or is in trouble, it is a new company or they are
in the innovative filed and current market did not learn yet how to recognize its value. As
another advantage of the investor, I would point out the uncertainty of the markets and that
nobody can predict the future. Therefore, not him nor the company can be sure about the
future results. The discussed three factors can result positively for the investor and make him
earn lots of money, sometimes even way more than he has expected. (Healy & Palepu, 1993;
Bagherpour & ArabSalehi, 2008). But what happens if because of the lack of information and
badly  recognized  value  he  ends  up  loosing  his  money?  Then,  he  would  face  a  “lemon
problem” which I will discuss later on in my thesis.
What would happen if all of the information would be publicly available to everyone?
Well for sure it would make the investor happier. As he would know all of the details he could
clearly see the value of the company and decide whether it is fair or not. By analysing the
information he could calculate the expected return on investment and the risk associated with
it (Petrova et. al. 2012). He still  wouldn't  be capable of knowing the future in 100 % but it
would be easier for him to predict it and he would feel safer. What about the company? Well,
they would really need to work hard, and carefully analyse each decision. There would be
nothing to hide, each move would be registered and known publicly. The market value would
be fair and real. It would be like playing poker with open cards. The only risk of the investor
would be to decide which company will grow faster and when should he back off in order to
do it  before the price of shares would start to decrease.  
2.2. Lemon problem
Information asymmetry leads to so called by George Akerlof, the lemon problem. “If
consumers cannot tell the quality of a product and are willing to pay only an average price
for it, then this price is more attractive for sellers who have bad products than to seller who
have good products (…) This lemons idea is also important for corporate finance: if investors
cannot observe the value of firms before they buy them then they would be willing to pay only
an average price for the equity of firms.”  ( Spiegel 2013). 
Although,  with  the  broader  information  the  investor  would  allocate  his  financial
resources better, he is not capable of doing so because of the lack of the information. One of
the examples to prove Akerlof's thesis would be Quindell case. “Quindell Plc is a provider of
innovative and sector  leading expertise  in  Insurance Technology,  Usage Based Insurance
(UBI),  and  Connected  Car  Telematics.”  (http://www.quindell.com/about-quindell  /) The
company seemed perfect to many of the investors. After analysing their mandatory, financial
statements nothing has looked suspicious. On the 19th of February 2014 its price has reached
its peak becoming 660 pounds per share making the investors happier than they have ever
expected  to  be.  (https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=QPP.L#symbol=QPP.L;range=2y).
Unfortunately,  it  did  not  last  long...   The  value  of  the  company was  not  stable  and was
fluctuating a lot. On the 21st of April the market value started to drop... It was not  just a little
decrease. The price per share has decreased by over 200 pounds. The price at a closing date
on 21st of April  2014 was 585 pounds and just a day after,  on 22nd of April  2014 356,25
pounds. That tendency did not stop and over a year after ( 02/06/2015) Quintell's price per
share  is  128,38  pounds.  (https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?
s=QPP.L#symbol=QPP.L;range=2y   ).   What  has  happened  to  the  company that  its  value
suddenly dropped? Could it be predicted by the investors? Did they have any signs signalling
that it would be better to back off? Unfortunately, most of the indicators were ignored. The
company seemed as a perfect money making machine that almost nobody, even thought of
investigating its financial statements, was suspicious about. It is assumed that Gotham City
Research has had a strong impact over Quindell's shares' value. On the 22nd of April 2014 an
article about Quindell's has been published on http://gothamcityresearch.com  . The unknown
author has analysed mandatory statements of this firm and came to surprising conclusion...
Most of the accounts has been falsified. First of all, between 42% to 80% of Quindell's profits
were doubtful because of inability to confirm its source and due to the differences with the
other party (if the source was available). Moreover, although the exact number is not fully
clear,  from 26% to  43% of  company's  revenues  in  2010 came from subsidiary company
owned by CEO Robert Terry ( Clickus4.com). In 2011 over 40% of company's revenues came
from an undisclosed  related  party.  Another  important  inaccuracy in  Quindell's  statements
would  include  one  of  its  subsidiary  companies,  Himex  &  Ingenie,  which  in  2013  was
responsible  for  generating  over  60% of  the  revenues  but  at  the  same time  had deficient
balance sheet accounts. Moreover in years 2011-2013 accounts receivable were between 86%-
231% of Quindel's revenues, while deferred revenue only between 1%-2% of the revenues.
The unknown researcher  has  found many other  facts  which should make investors  doubt
about company's real value. At the end of his research he valued the company at not more
than 3 pounds per share.  (http://gothamcityresearch.com/2014/04/22/quindell-plc-a-country-
club-built-on-quicksand/   )
How can the lemon problem be solved? From investor's  perspective there are two
options. One of the possibilities is to try to gather as much as possible of useful information
which would allow him to more clearly see the company's real value. Another one is to hire an
external expert who will analyse the case objectively. This happened in previously mentioned
example of Quindell, an external investigation has been performed bringing the shares price
down closer to its real market value. There is also another possibility which relies in hands of
the company which has to compete with “lemons”... reduce the information asymmetry. If
honest companies will provide its investors with more information, it is more than probable
that the investors will discover their true value and therefore, will be willing to pay more for
the shares, will become capable of seeing the true quality and of recognizing the lemons.
(Akerlof 1970).
2.3. Cost of capital
Information asymmetry has its effect also on the cost of capital.  Cost of capital is
related to the opportunity cost of investing in one firm rather than in another one. This is the
return rate, that could be earned by the investor, if he has decided to allocate his financial
resources  elsewhere,  considering  that  the  risk  of  both  investments  would  the  same.
Simplifying, cost of capital is the rate of return needed to convince the investor to invest in a
specific investment.  (Kolton et.  al.  2001;  Petrova et.  al.  2012) How does the information
asymmetry affects the cost of capital? The higher the information asymmetry the higher the
cost of capital (Petrova et. al. 2012). This can be easily proven... Imagine you want to buy a
house... As you have more information provided you are more likely to purchase it. Usually,
you are even willing to pay more than for the house about which you do not know as much.
They can be exactly the same, but somehow you trust the one with more information more.
Well, it works really similar in the capital markets. Whenever the investor is about to make an
investment he wants to know as much as possible, to make sure that his decision is right. Less
information leads to higher information asymmetry, the investment becomes more risky and
therefore  the  cost  of  capital  increases.  The  opportunity  cost  of  making  that  investment
becomes higher and he prefers to allocate his money elsewhere. How can the company reach
the investor? They should decrease the information gap which would lead to decrease in the
capital cost. If the cost of capital is lower, investors are more likely to invest in that project.
Therefore, it is better for companies if they provide its investors with more information, so
that the cost of capital is lower (Kolton et. al. 2001; Petrova et. al. 2012). Is the information
required by GAAP and IFRS etc. enough to reduce information asymmetry and therefore, the
cost of capital? Should companies consider other options of decreasing that gap?
Before  I  move  on,  into  analysing  the  answer  to  that  question  let's  try  to  answer
another,  more  simple  problem...  Why,  and  what  for,  do  companies  collect  accounting
information? The main reason is to be capable of making right decisions, especially decisions
regarding the business and its financial  future.   “Information produced by the accounting
information systems are important for the effective management of business activities, and
according  to  the  type  of  users,  its  information  requests  and  needs  vary.”  Stanković,
Alexandra, Miloš Mitrić, and Snežana Knežević. 'Business and FinancialDecisions Based on
Information Provided by Accounting Information Systems'.  Advanced Research in Scientific
Areas (2012): 660-663.
There  are  two types  of  accounting information:  compulsory and voluntary.  As the
company does not control what has to be included in its compulsory statements, it has the
whole freedom regarding the voluntary part. Next chapter of my thesis will focus on both
types of information. I will analyse pros and cons of each of them, its effects on the company,
and also what makes the companies publish more than the government requires.
3. COMPULSORY AND VOLUNTARY  DISCLOSURE
To have a clear idea about what will be analysed further on in my thesis I would like to
start this chapter with basic definitions of both types of disclosures but before we move on to
that let's answer a more simple issue... What exactly do we mean by disclosure? 
Owusu-Ansah  (1998)  explains  disclosure  as  “the  communication  of  economic
information,  whether  financial  or  non-financial,  quantitative  or  otherwise  concerning  a
company’s  financial  position  and  performance”  (Owusu-Ansah,  Stephen  'The  Impact  Of
Corporate  Attribites  On  the  Extent  Of  Mandatory  Disclosure  And  Reporting  By  Listed
Companies in Zimbabwe'. The International Journal of Accounting 33.5 (1998): 605-631).
This  statement  leads  us  to  a  pretty  clear  idea  of  how it  can  get  divided  into  two  parts
mentioned previously: mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
3.1. Mandatory disclosure
As I couldn't find one definition that would fully describe compulsory disclosure I
have  decided to  use  various  explanations.  First  of  all,  “mandatory disclosure consists  of
information disclosed in order to comply with the requirements of laws and regulations.”
Shehata,  Nermeen Fathy.  'Theories  And Determinants  Of  Voluntary  Disclosure'.  AFR 3.1
(2013). This  statement  can  get  more  developed  by  “Compulsory  information  disclosure
means relevant laws and rules, such as Company Law, Securities Law, Accounting Rules, and
regulatory  agencies’ regulations,  clearly  regulate  that  listed  companies  must  actualize
information disclosure.” Tian, Yu, and Jingliang Chen. 'Concept Of Voluntary Information
Disclosure  And  A Review  Of  Relevant  Studies'.  International  Journal  of  Economics  and
Finance  1.2  (2009).  According  to  these  statements  mandatory  disclosure  is  what  the
government has required and it is restricted by certain rules and laws.  Companies must fulfil
various requirements. It is the same for all of the companies and differers slightly depending
on the country. If the published information is so official and publicly required why isn't it
enough? Answer to this  question can be found in  The Trend  Toward  Voluntary Corporate
Disclosures article. Schuster and O'Connell (2006) state that mandatory information can be
highly manipulated especially in case of managerial profits. Moreover, the limited amount of
data  published is  not  enough to predict  future  performance of  the company.  It  is  mainly
because it does not include all of the factors affecting company's future. Mandatory disclosure
focuses  mostly on  numerical  data  not  taking  into  account  non-financial  performance and
intangible  assets  of  the  company  as  for  example,  human  capital,  customer  relations,
innovation, research and development (R&D), and corporate reputation. All of these factors
have a strong impact on company's value especially, if we look at the long-term performance.
Compulsory disclosure also avoids analysis of investment risk and long-term effects of capital
investments (Schuster & O'Connell, 2006). When talking about mandatory disclosure it must
be mentioned that it provides a core, formal and official information to the public. Although
the  additional  information  can  be  found  in  voluntary  statements  of  the  company  and
shareholders usually can get the inside information from the management... annual reports are
usually  what  matters  in  analysing  company's  value  (Shehata  2013).  If annual  reports
(mandatory information) are usually the only source of people's perception of the company is
it worth to show more than required? 
The last issue about mandatory disclosure that I would like to point out is the fact that
it  does not provide a reasonable forecast about firm's future...  Jacobson states that annual
reports,  although official,  are  used more as a form of advertising,  improvement  in  public
relations  and  company's  image  but,  they  do  not  serve  much  in  case  of  decision-making
process (Shehata 2013). 
Why does the government requires only a part of companies financial information?
Why don't they ask for more in order to make sure that the published information is reliable?
Compulsory information leaves some gaps leading to information asymmetry...  and this is
where the need for voluntary information disclosure arises. 
3.2. Voluntary disclosure and its types
In the most simple way we can define voluntary disclosure as  “free choices on the
part of company managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant
to the decision needs of users of their annual reports.” ( Meek et al. (1995: 555). 
Again, as in the case of mandatory disclosure, I was not able to find one definition that
would include all  of the aspects,  therefore,  I  decided to analyse different studies and put
acquired information together. 
One of main goals of voluntary disclosure is to better communicate company's value
to its potential investors. As more information is available, investors can easier recognize the
value  and predict  future  performance lowering  the  risk  of  the  investment.  It  also  should
increase their willingness to invest especially, if they see the company as a good business
opportunity.  Voluntary disclosure aims to  improve the fluidity of capital  market  and push
towards more efficient allocation of capital, bringing the average cost down. High level of
voluntary  disclosure  will  result  in  more  complex  and  positive  communication  with  its
stakeholders. It should have a positive effect on companies' images ( especially in case of
good  news),  its  relations  with  investors  and  other  stakeholders.  As  the  extension  of
compulsory  information,  it  provides  public  with  more  complex  view  and  perception  of
company's future performance (Tian & Chen, 2009, Kolton et. al. 2001)
Therefore, voluntary disclosure, in contrast to mandatory disclosure, relies completely
in managements hands. They are the ones who decide what, when and how much to publish.
They have a  full control over what will be known to the public and have to decide what
would be the best option for their firm. 
Types of voluntary disclosure
Regarding to what the company has decided to reveal we can classify that information
into  one  of  the  six  categories:  Business  data,  Management’s  analysis  of  business  data,
Forward-looking information, Information about management and shareholders , Background
about the company and Information about intangible assets. It is also believed that voluntary
disclosure  of  this  types  of  information  should  have  positive  effect  on  many  aspects  of
company's activity as for example: market value, reputation, cost of capital etc. (Kolton et. al.
2001).  I  would like to  describe each of these six types  and investigate  its  effects  on the
company's performance. 
3.3.1.  Business data
Voluntary disclosure of business data usually relates to publishing internal operating
data and performance measurements which are used by the management to drive the business.
It can be classified into few subcategories depending on what the managers decide to publish.
(Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Sales
Voluntary  disclosure  of  this  information  could  include  market  share  divided  by  regions,
monthly amount of orders grouped by product categories and strategic business units, any
additional information about sales and marketing teams usually also presenting the amount of
professionals, diversification in sales strategies depended on regions etc. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Products
Depending on the firm's activity and product's  type different information will  be publicly
shared. Managers can decide to inform public about new product lines or extensions of the old
ones,  changes  in  volume  regarding  business  groups  or  geographical  locations,  eventual
agreements  or  product  alliances,  relevant  information  about  product  present  users  and
expectations regarding the future. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Operations
In company's interest should be also sharing the information about firm's operations.  This
form of disclosure could include informing stakeholders about plant's capacities grouped by
products  and  compared  with  previous  years  and  expected  schedule  for  upcoming  year,
employees  productivity  and  sales  per  worker  before  interest  and  taxes,   reports  about
expansion to new geographical locations using joint ventures, details about labour contracts
and other precise information about form of hiring employees etc. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Financial Performance 
To improve the communication level and to improve relation with investors company should
share voluntary information abut its financial performance. This information would be usually
disclosed in a form of graphs representing earnings per share and company's capability of
keeping that performance, return on invested capital, comparison of other forms of controlling
financial performance using benchmarking. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
3.3.2. Management’s analysis of business data
If the managers decide to disclose their private analysis they usually should focus on 
explaining the circumstances for changes in the operating and performance related data also 
focusing on the identification of past effects and trends. Similarly, it consists of four 
subcategories. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Sales
Regarding sales disclosure of management's analysis of business data, the information that
would be valuable for stakeholders would be analysis of marketplace according to regions and
countries, volume and price, discussion regarding product's position and its impact on brand
name and sales, also the possible effects of market conditions on sales volume and prices.
(Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Products
Also  detailed  information  about  company's  products  might  bring  positive  effect  on
stakeholders  perception  and  therefore,  be  beneficial  for  the  firm.  In  disclosing  the
information,  management  should  have  on  mind  sharing  the  goals  regarding  the  products
revenues, summary of some questionnaires and other market research tools including clients
opinions and concerns about the products, domestic market share compared with competitors.
(Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Operations
As management is supposed to analyse every aspect of companies operations it would be
relevant  to  communicate  detailed  information  about  the  possibilities  of  strikes  effects,
additional information about influence of technology on research and development, some past
data about raw materials its impact on product prices and an analyse of future expected path.
(Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Financial Performance 
Internal  managements  information  about  financial  performance of  the  company would  be
useful to share with the others if it highlights accomplishments and success in the past years,
informs about earnings, partnerships, includes benchmarking analysis. It would be beneficial
to share financial indicators as: return on equity, total shareholders return, earnings per share,
earnings and revenues grow. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
3.3.3. Forward-looking information
Regarding forward-looking information managers usually collect data about future possible
opportunities  and  upcoming  risks,  their  plans  involving  success  factors  and  many
comparisons with past performances, its affects on the future and how the past future plans
have been well predicted. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Sales
As managers already should have this information collected it would be useful for them to
share  forecasts  including  their  expectations  about  units  sold  in  next  year  separated  by
locations, analysis of growth opportunities and threats etc. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Products
In case of using patented products it would be beneficial to mention future perspectives for
products which patents are about to expire and possible damage in revenues. Also favourable
would be include expansion prospectives for a brand or product with the respect to specific
locations. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Operations
Stakeholders  would  be  better  off  knowing  managements  future  targets  in  revenues,  net
income, gross margins and also their expectations regarding decrease in the ratio of expenses
to  revenues.  It  would  be  useful  for  them  to  be  informed  about  projected  cash  flows,
company's  reports  about  goals  and  milestones  to  be  achieved.  Management  should  share
information about any plans regarding company's future operations which could be analysis of
potential new locations or possible new markets. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Financial Performance 
Regarding financial performance stakeholders should be informed about expected earnings
and free cash flows. It would be good to share reasonable speculations expanding to next five
years of activity with different possible variants of EPS, ROE, ROA. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
3.3.4. Information about management and shareholders
Detailed data about firm's directors, management, biggest shareholders and 
relationships within the company could make the stakeholders closer to the business and 
therefore be beneficial for its interest. Despite the fact that this is a useful data most of this 
information is already required in mandatory statements. Managers can make a difference 
adding additional information which could be for example: detailed description of executive 
management succession plans. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
3.3.5. Background about the company
Making stakeholders know more about firm's activity would bring positive effects on 
company's activity. Managers should share broad objectives, mission and vision statements, 
strategies, its influence on the industry etc. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Sales
Regarding  sales  data  management  should  focus  on  disclosing  information  about  any
legislation form needed affecting the sales level of the products. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Products
Detailed description of the product lines and products itself with the emphasis on the usage
possibilities should encourage clients into increased use and push investors towards investing.
That disclosure should also include trends in the industry and possible impacts on the firm's
current product lines.  It  would be beneficial  to  provide more information about products,
brands, and trademarks. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Operations
Stakeholders might value any additional information about number of employees, factories
and  products  manufactured.  Managers  should  consider  informing  about  ways  to  control
operation  expenses  and  strategy  for  research  and  development,  and  also  long-term
performance objectives. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
 Financial Performance 
In  this  subcategory  it  would  be  good  to  inform  stakeholders  about  firm's  strategy  for
acquisition,  and  any necessary  information  about  directors  or  management  past  financial
performances. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
3.3.6. Information about intangible assets
Management should put high effort into explaining intangible assets of the company,
especially  because  of  the  fact  that  accounting  standards  usually  do  not  recognize  them.
Mandatory information does not take into account intangible aspects, and therefore the value
of the company is usually lower. Financial statements concentrate strictly on numerical data
that can be easily valued.“Disclosure of  information about unrecognized intangible assets
such as research and development, human resources, customer relations, innovations, and
others that are critical to the success of a business would be especially helpful to investors in
making  investment  decisions.”  (Improving  business  reporting).  That  voluntary  disclosure
would be useful them because of being capable of recognizing the true value of the company
and lowering the risk about mistaken future expectation. (Kolton et. al. 2001).
4. FACTORS  AFFECTING  MANAGEMENT  DECISIONS  ABOUT  VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE 
After having a clear view of both types of disclosure I would like to move on into
analysing the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary disclosure of the companies. To do
so I will start with the factors which push the managers into revealing more information than
required by the government but also the factors that stop them from doing so. 
4.1. Favourable factors towards voluntary disclosure
There are six different factors that encourage managers to voluntary disclosure. Those
factors  are:  capital  market  transactions,  corporate  control  contests,  stock  compensation,
litigation,  proprietary  costs,  management  talent  signalling  and  limitations  of  mandatory
disclosures. (Healy and Palepu 2001; Graham 2005).
4.1.1 Capital market transactions hypothesis
The perception of how the company is seen by the investors has impact on disclosing
decisions taken by the management. It has a stronger impact in case when the company is in
need of external source of financing. Providing only mandatory information does not decrease
the information asymmetry. As mentioned before in my thesis, that gap leads to higher cost of
capital and higher risk associated with that investment.  While facing the need of acquiring
external capital  at  a lower cost possible that inequality in information should be reduced.
Regarding that, the managers who are planning to make capital market transactions will be
willing to voluntarily disclose internal information of the company. (Healy and Palepu 2001;
(Myers & Majluf, 1984; (Bagherpour & ArabSalehi, 2008).
4.1.2. Corporate control contest hypothesis
The main tool to control the managers by the boards of directors and investors is the
stock performance of the company – price of shares. Managers use voluntary disclosure in
order  to protect the company from undervaluation and in case of poor performance,  they
prefer to communicate bad news step by step by themselves in order to avoid a sharp drop in
stock prices. They are willing to better communicate with stakeholders because of the risk of
job loss.  Managers  use voluntary disclosure as a tool  to explain poor  stock and earnings
performance.  (Healy and Palepu 2001). Higher level of voluntary disclosure would drive to
increased  analyst  coverage.  More  information  available  will  lead  to  higher  interest  from
analyst as the cost of acquiring information has deceased. It would result in higher interest in
analysis  performed about  the company and therefore,  reflect  its  fair  value in  the market.
(Graham, 2005) 
4.1.3. Stock compensation hypothesis
In order to motivate the management into better performance several rewards are used.
One of the most common method is stock compensation. This type of premium positively
influences managers decisions regarding voluntary disclosure mainly because of two reasons.
(Healy and Palepu 2001).
First, as they are also “owners” of the company and they are interested in trading their
shares  they  will  try  to  increase  its  stock  value,  and  moreover  to  correct  it  in  case  of
underestimation.  Therefore,  they  would  be  willing  to  share  internal  information  and  to
voluntarily disclose private information.  (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
The second reason to increase the level of voluntary disclosure is the reduction of
contracting costs which are related  to stock compensation for new employees. In this case
managers  would  act  in  favour  of  the  existing  shareholders.  Increased  level  of  voluntary
disclosure would therefore, reduce contracting cost connected to stock compensation for new
employees (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
A study carried out by Aboody and Kasznik (2000) points out that during the stock
option award period managers tent to postpone disclosure of positive news and enhance bad
news in order to increase future stock-based compensation. (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000).
4.1.4. Litigation Cost Hypothesis
Managers concern about shareholders litigation can affect their disclosure decisions.
First, the firm might decide to increase the level of voluntary disclosure due to inadequate or
untimely disclosures. On the other hand, the fear of litigation might decrease the willingness
to disclosure, especially of the forward-looking information, (Healy and Palepu 2001), I will
focus on this negative aspect further on in my thesis. In his work, Skinner (1994) investigates
the effect of pre-disclosed bad information and cost of litigation. He realises that in case of
absence of litigation, managers prefer to keep the balance in disclosing good and bad news.
Also he states that pre-disclosure of poor performance of the company reduces the probability
of litigation. It is mainly because the drop in share prices is distributed over time and there is
no sudden drop in stock value of the company which is easier to recover once good news
come. (Skinner 1994).
4.1.5. Management Talent Signalling Hypothesis
Managers  with  the  capability  of  accurate  earnings  forecasting  will  be  willing  to
voluntarily  disclosure  their  personal  information.  It  is  mainly  because  company's  market
values depends on investors' perception of management skills of recognizing and responding
to future environmental changes. If the forecast performed by the manager is adequate it is
more than probable that the market value of the company will increase.  (Healy and Palepu
2001)
4.1.6. Limitations of mandatory disclosures
As mentioned before, compulsory information is what the government requires. It is a
basic and limited form of communicating company's  performance.  Many people complain
that mandatory data published it hard to understand and includes only financial aspects of the
firm  forgetting  about  non-financial  indicators  and  intangible  assets.  Also,  mandatory
information is published every three months causing lack of timeliness and a need for more
frequent channels of communication. Those concerns and inequalities push towards voluntary
disclosure, which would reduce the information gap arising from providing stakeholders only
with compulsory form of knowledge. ( Graham, 2005)
4.2. Unfavourable factors driving managers away from voluntary disclosure
Voluntary  disclosure  also  entails  some  negative  consequences.  It  makes  the
management  double  think  the  decision  whether  it  is  worth  for  the  company's  interest  to
disclose more than the government requires in mandatory statements. In this chapter I will
analyse five main aspects pulling away from voluntary disclosure. 
4.2.1. Disclosure precedent
Once the company decides to voluntarily disclosure its internal information it is really
hard to back off. Managers are afraid that if they decide towards voluntary disclosure in the
future they will  be pushed to continue doing so. It  would not be so bad if the additional
information would be always good. In case of poor performance or bad times management
probably would rather just keep the information for themselves or simply would not be too
proud of sharing it. Although, it is usually better for the company's interest if the bad news are
coming out directly from the management I believe that many times the firm would rather
hide this data or at least postpone them in time. This practice would have higher use in case
when there is a high probability that poor performance is just temporary and the toxic news
can be easily hidden or, shared latter on together with good news.
Voluntary  disclosure  practise  also  entails  an  increase  in  people's  expectations
regarding future information, people would expect more and more internal data to be shared.
(Graham 2005).
4.2.2. Litigation costs
As already mentioned in part 4.1.4. litigation hypothesis has two possible outcomes on
voluntary disclosure.  One, affects it positively, driving managers towards increased voluntary
disclosure.  The other one has negative impact,  preventing the management of sharing too
much. That aspect will be discussed in this section of my thesis. Managers are pushed away
from voluntary disclosure mainly because of the lack of willingness to share their private
forward-looking speculations. It would have stronger impact in case when the manager could
be penalised for bad speculations. ( Graham 2005; Healy and Palepu 2001). In case of the fear
of litigation managers prefer not to share that much in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts. If
the stakeholders do not know as much about the company they will be less involved and
therefore,  the  decision-making  process  would  be  faster.  The  tactic  to  step  away  from
voluntary disclosure  would  also  decrease  the  possible  costs  of  litigation.  (Graham,  2005;
Haley and Palepu, 2001).
4.2.3. Proprietary Cost Hypothesis
One  of  the  reasons  why  firms  are  not  willing  to  voluntarily  disclosure  more
information that necessary is the threat of loosing their competitive advantage. Even though,
the additional information would decrease the cost of capital, many times the managers prefer
to keep the internal information within the company and pay a premium for getting external
financing.  Proprietary  cost  hypothesis  can  negatively  affect  voluntary  disclosure  of
information because of managements fear of revealing too much and loosing their competitive
position in the market. (Healy and Palepu 2001).
4.2.4. Agency costs
Managers  decide  to  avoid  unnecessary  attention  from  the  stakeholders.  Limiting
voluntary disclosure of unimportant information would safe many not desariable questions
and comments leading to faster decision making process and saving agency costs. (Graham,
2005)
4.2.5. Political costs
For own comfort managers would prefer not to disclosure that much in order to limit
the amount of information that can be used against them. The level of impact of political costs
depends on the size of the company. Big companies with a high level of profits are more
likely to decrease the level of voluntary disclosure. It is mainly to avoid being involved in any
political attacks. (Graham, 2005; Shehata, 2013).
4.3. Conclusion
As we can see there are  many different factors affecting managers perception and
incentive regarding voluntary disclosure. One of them push towards sharing all the internal
information.,  other  put  the  red  light  in  managers  heads  and  block  their  willingness  to
disclosure private data.  Voluntary disclosure has its advantages and disadvantages and the
managers' role it to find a perfect equilibrium, giving the best option for the company.
5. CONSEQUENCES OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE – PRACTICAL CASE
In  this  chapter  of  my  thesis  I  would  like  to  focus  on  the  practical  aspects  and
consequences of voluntary disclosure. First, I will discuss the facts about voluntary disclosure
from managements point of view. Later on, I will move on into analysing two different cases
of how disclosure affects companies' market performance The first case will be related to
stock price increase related to higher level of good information available. Another one will
focus on stock price decrease caused by the disclosure of bad news. Each of these parts will
be divided into two parts. One analysing effects of disclosure if it has been voluntarily done
by the company. Another one will examine the opposite scenario... the additional information
comes from an external source.
5.1. Facts about voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure relies mainly in managers hands. In this section I would like to
introduce their opinion and experience about how it affects the company. To do so, I will
analyse a survey performed by Graham (2005). In his article we can find the answers of 401
financial executives to 12 questions. In this part of my thesis I have just selected the questions
that  highly  relate  to  voluntary  disclosure  and  show its  consequences  from managements
perception.
The  first  question  of  the  survey  that  demonstrates  motives  towards  voluntary
disclosure was:
1. Do these statements describe your company's motives for voluntarily communicating 
financial information?
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reduces our cost of capital
increases our P/E ratio
corrects an under-valued stock price
increases the predictability of our company's future prospects
increases the overall liquidity of our stock
reveals to outsiders the skill level of our managers
attracts more financial analysts to follow our stock
promotes a reputation for transparent/accurate reporting
reduces the "information risk" that investors assign to our stock
reduces the risk premium employees demand for holding stock 
granted as compensation
provides important information to investors that is not included 
in mandatory financial disclosures
Other motives that encourage voluntary disclosure:
Source: https://www.faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/finrep/survey.htm
As we can see the respondents had to analyse various options (with a possibility of
adding  their  own  response)  and  assign  points  depending  on  the  level  of  agreement  or
disagreement. 
92.1% of the respondents strongly agree that “Voluntarily communicating information
promotes  a  reputation  for  transparent/accurate  reporting” and  only  2%  is  against  that
statement. This is the most valued answer. On average it got 1.39 points meaning that most of
financial executives find this motive the most useful towards voluntary disclosure. The second
and the third most scored answers were the statements about reduction of information risk that
investors  assign  to  firm's  stock  and the  fact  that  voluntary disclosure  provides  important
information to investors that is  not taken into account in compulsory part.  These answers
make us realize that companies'  see the positive effect of voluntary disclosure which are:
reducing the investment risk and reducing the information asymmetry. 81.9% and 72.1% of
respondents have strongly agreed with that statements getting the average rating of 1.03 and
0.86 respectively. 
Surprisingly, not so many financial executives have recognized the decrease of cost of
capital as the effect of voluntary disclosure. That aspect got only 39.3% of strongly agree and
22.0% of strongly disagree responds with the final average ratio of 0.17 meaning that on
average voluntarily communicating information has close to neutral effect on cost of capital
decrease. Complete results of the survey can be found in Appendix, table 1.
Second question of the survey meant to identify the most common issues that hold the
management from disclosing too much. Negative consequences of voluntary disclosure have
been listed leaving the option of adding own experience.
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avoid giving away "company secrets" or otherwise harming our 
competitive position
avoid attracting unwanted scrutiny by regulators
avoid attracting unwanted scrutiny by stockholders and 
bondholders
avoid potential follow-up questions about unimportant items
avoid possible lawsuits if future results don't match forward-
looking disclosures
avoid setting a disclosure precedent that may be difficult to 
continue
Other motives that affect your desire to limit voluntary disclosure:
Source: https://www.faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/finrep/survey.htm
Regarding  the  answers,  the  most  common  issue  that  causes  the  desire  to  limit
voluntary disclosure is the fear of difficulty to continue with disclosures precedent in the
future. In this case 69.6% of respondents strongly agree and 14.7% strongly disagree resulting
in the average final score of 0.74. It  means that in general firms decide not to disclosure
because they find it hard to stop in the future. Another aspect that highly limits the tendency
towards  voluntary  disclosure  is  the  fear  of  loosing  competitive  advantage.  58.8%  of
participants strongly agree with that statement and 24.8% strongly disagrees, giving the final
average  score  of  0.49.  Analysing  this  answer  we  can  conclude  that  sharing  internal
information might have a negative effect on position in the market and decrease the level of
competitiveness. 
Respondents answers also suggest that voluntary disclosure does not attract unwanted
scrutiny by regulators or unwanted scrutiny by stockholders and bondholders. Both of this
answers got a negative average score of -0.52 and -0.56 respectively. In both cases over 54%
of  respondents  have  strongly  disagree  that  these  two  issues  push  them towards  limiting
voluntary disclosure. Complete results of the survey can be found in Appendix 1, table 2.
Two next following questions focused on the release of good and bad news and what
the company is more willing to share.
2a. Based on your company's experience, is good news or bad news released to the 
public faster?
Bad News Faster No difference Good News Faster
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Disclosing bad news faster enhances our reputation for 
transparent and accurate reporting
Disclosing bad news faster reduces our risk of potential lawsuits
Good news is released faster because bad news takes longer to 
analyze and interpret
Good news is released faster because we try to package bad 




52.9%  of  firms  are  indifferent  between  the  timing  of  disclosing  good  or  bad
information. 26.6% is more likely to disclose bad news faster and 20.5% puts the priority on
good news. Following that questions Graham decided to examine the motives related to the
timing of voluntary disclosure. 76.8% of respondents strongly agreed that “Disclosing bad
news faster enhances our reputation for transparent and accurate reporting” and “Disclosing
bad news faster reduces our risk of potential lawsuits”. Regarding the average rating the
score slightly differs,  respectively is  0.93 and 0.91 points.  The difference arises form the
degree of strongly disagree which has been 3.7% and 8.4% respectively. Surprisingly, only
35.5% of the participants said strongly agree in speeding up voluntary disclosure of good
news in order to cover bad news. In this case the level of strongly disagree was very similar,
37.1% leading to average rating of -0.05 suggesting that in general management is very close
to neutral in timing the voluntary disclosure of good news in order to cover up bad news.
Complete results of the survey can be found in Appendix, table 3.
The  last  question  on  which  I  would  like  to  focus  collects  data  about  three  most
important performance measures.
3. Rank the three most important performance measures reported to outsiders.
(Enter a "1", "2", and "3"; leave the others blank.)
Cash flows from operations
Earnings






Regarding the responds the answer is pretty clear. The three most important measures
are:  Earnings,  Revenues  and  Cash  flows  from operations.  159  financial  executives  have
placed Earnings as the most important performance measure. On the second place with 97
respondents we can see Revenues, and on the third one Cash flows from operations with 93
nominations. 
In order to have a better perception points have been assigned to each valuation. If the
measure has been ranked at the first place it got 3 points, if as second 2 points and, if as the
third one one point. Respectively with that rule Revenues got 642, Revenues 377 and, Cash
flow from operations 345 points.
Most of mentioned answers can be found in mandatory statements of the companies.
We can see that even though the same group of respondents previously claimed that voluntary
disclosure  is  important  they  do  not  consider  parts  of  voluntary  disclosure  as  the  most
important indicators to communicate with outsiders. Complete results of the survey can be
found in Appendix, table 4.
5.1.1. Conclusion
As I have mentioned previously I have decided to focus only questions strictly related
with   voluntary  disclosure,  therefore,  I  won't  be  analysing  the  rest  of  the  survey.  Full
questionnaire  can  be  found  on
http://www.faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/finrep/survey.htm.
From this survey we can conclude that in general voluntary disclosure is recognized as
an important tool in communicating company's value. Despite the fact, that it does not include
the most important measures to report to outsiders it is very useful in other cases. Most of the
respondents answers were in accordance with researches, statements and articles mentioned in
my thesis. This means that they were knowledgable about voluntary disclosure, they knew the
motives and limitations and had some previous experience regarding that topic. 
5.2. Empirical examples of effects of voluntary disclosure
In order to prove that voluntary disclosure is meaningful I would like to present the
analysis of two companies' market value with respect to level of voluntary disclosure. I have
selected these two completely different firms in order to prove the point previously discussed
in  my  thesis:  increased  level  of  voluntary  disclosure  has  positive  effects  on  stock
performance. The selected companies are: Let's Gowex S.A. and British Petroleum PLC. I
will analyse each of their stock performance affected by disclosure of information.
5.2.1. Gowex case
Following previously discussed example of Quindell, mentioned in section 2.2., I have
decided to perform more precise analysis of similar firm – Let's Gowex, S.A. (Gowex). 
Gowex is a Spanish Wi-Fi provider. The company has been created in 1999 but the
wireless  activity  started  in  2004  (http://www.gowex.com/en/).  The  company  has  been
crushing the market with its free Wi-Fi networks. Their market price has been increasing and
they were getting stronger and stronger market position. Gowex was following the rules of
mandatory disclosure avoiding any type of voluntary disclosure. They were publishing what
they were obliged to, without providing any extra information about the company. Everything
was just perfect till the moment when unknown author from Gotham City Research decided to
publish an external investigation of company's value. The report has been published on the
30th of June 2014 on Gotham City research web-page, resolving in a huge drop in price per
share. The research has questioned sources of revenues, firm's profits and data published in
mandatory statements. In conclusion, the author of the article values the company at 0.00
euros. Full research can be found on (http://gothamcityresearch.com/2014/07/01/lets-gowex-
la-charada-pescanova-a-pescanovan-charade/).
The tendency of the price per share can be seen in Graph 2 modified from Yahoo
Finance UK. We can see that on the 4th of April 2014 Gowex's shares were valued at 25.52
euros per share. Starting from this point we can see fluctuations with the general decreasing
tendency of its value. Another important date, that I would like to point out, is 30 th of June
2014. This is the date when the Gotham's City Research report has been published. Opening
price in this day was 19.91 euros per share. Starting from this point, we can see a sharp drop,
leading to the price of 10.71 euros (1st of July 2014) just in one day, making it a total decrease
of 46.21%. Bad tendency did not finish just in one day... On the 2nd of July 2014, the price has
hit 8.04 euros per share making a total decrease (in period from 30.06.2014 to 02.07.2014) of
59.62%. Stock market and Gowex's shareholders were not prepared for this kind of bad news.
There was a panic in the market... everyone wanted to sell “toxic” shares. Despite its low
price, they would rather get rid of their shares. This surprise resulted in reducing the traded
volume to zero and suspending future trading of Gowex's shares.
5.2.2. British Petroleum (BP) case
This section of my thesis I would like to dedicate to a well known company in the oil
industry, British Petroleum PLC (BP). I will investigate the effect of voluntary disclosure of
positive and negative news coming directly from the company.
BP, as all of the oil industry based company is highly responsible for carbon emission.
Nowadays,  we  can  see  “going  green”  tendency  in  the  society,  which  implies  higher
involvement in environmental activity of the firm. Therefore, companies with unfavourable
effects  are highly exposed to a negative public opinion, manifestations, strikes etc. All of this
incentives might cause a declining effect on its stock performance. Till the 2nd half of 2013 BP
was responsible for 2.5% of global gas emission, ranking the company as a 3rd one within
investor's  owned  firms  (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20/90-
companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change). 
BP's  adverse  activity  was  nothing  new  for  stakeholders.  Company  was  honestly
informing the public about its bad habits and also, what is even more important, was usually
connecting it with a good performance. On one hand a negative signal was sent about BP, to
soon be covered up, by some other favourable news. In order to conceal negative aspects
British  Petroleum  got  highly  involved  in  many  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR)
activities. Moreover, they created a platform to transform information about their activity- BP
Magazine.  On  their  web-page  we  can  find  a  statement  “Welcome  to  the  international
magazine of the BP group. We bring you regular reports from activities around the globe, the
people  who  make  them  happen,  and  the  challenges  that  face  our  industry.”
(http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/bp-magazine.html). 
Now,  I  would  like  to  move  into  analysis  of  share  price  tendency with  respect  to
information disclosure.
As it can be seen in Graph 2 BP's shares fluctuate during the time but there is no sharp,
long  drop  tendency.  This  variation  have  a  lot  in  common  with  voluntary  disclosure  of
information of the company. In the period between 15-19 of December 2014 we can see a
stock price increase. This is the time span when BP announced the purchase for cancellation
of the total of 3.206.000 ordinary shares. We can speculate that the believing of management
in  company's  value  has  pushed  the  market  price  up  changing  it  from  373.25  GBP
(15.12.2014) to 413.00 GBP (19.12.14), making a total increase in that period of 10.65%. On
the other hand BP's management is open about its harsh times. The company has been facing
a court case with a fine reaching even over 13 billions dollars. Due to the amount of available
information coming directly from the company and press release the possibility of a huge
penalty did not affect stock performance as strong, as it could in case of hiding information.
On Graph 2 we can see that the share price started to drop even before judge's final decision.
On the 14th of January 2015 we can see stock value improvement due to the possibility of
stagnant payments over time. Another important date it the 3rd of February 2015. This is the
day when British  Petroleum informed about  quarterly  loss  of  4.4  billions  dollars.  Again,
market has been prepared for this kind of bad news. The share price has slightly decreased
from 449.85 GBP (3.02.15) to 445.35 GBP (4.02.15) resulting in total drop of a bit less than
1%. BP is not shy about informing stakeholders about negative consequences of their activity.
On their official web-page we can find information about greenhouse gas emission. The report
has  been  published  in  the  2nd half  of  March  2015.  On Graph  2  we can  see  that  openly
informing the public about negative consequences of their activity, but also, giving additional
information  about  possible  solutions  to  reduce  it,  and  a  comparison  of  past  years  with
decreasing tendency, will pay off. In the period of that voluntary disclosure we can see a stock
improvement from 417.60 GBP on 16th of March 2015 to 451.00 GBP on 20th of March 2015,
resulting in total increase of nearly 8%. 
(https://www.bp.com/ ; http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/bp-magazine.html). 
(http://otp.investis.com/clients/uk/bp/rns/regulatory-story.aspx?cid=233&newsid=463485 and
http://otp.investis.com/clients/uk/bp/rns/regulatory-story.aspx?cid=233&newsid=465639)
Although,  the  tendency might  not  be  seen  so  clearly  from the  graph  it  has  been
analysed by Paul A. Griffin and Yuan Sun (2012). In their research they have studied 172
companies  and  their  stock  changes  in  relation  with  voluntary  disclosure.  They  have
discovered that firm's are better off in case of voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emission
(GHG) data, and strategies to decrease carbon emissions. They note that positive effect in
stock market can be seen few days after the information release. What is important, the effects
were compared with other companies, which did not provide any additional information. They
note, that in that case there was no significant share price increase. Despite the fact that GHG
emission  is  harmful  for  the  society,  it  sends  another  important  message:  the  company is
concious about its environmental responsibility. Seeing markets reactions, investors simply
prefer to invest in this type of company (Griffin and Sun, 2012).
5.2.3 Conclusion
As we can see in the following examples, disclosure of additional information might
have positive or negative consequences on company's market value. 
In  case  of  Quindell  and Gowex the  disclosure  came from an  external  source  and
included unfavourable information... Share prices of both companies faced a sharp drop in
their  value.  It  was  mainly due  to  the  fact  that  these  firms  have  been manipulating  their
financial statements and market has finally recognized its true value. 
On the other hand many times it is better if firm's management honestly informs its
stakeholders  about  bad  situation  or  negative  factors.  Shareholders  will  appreciate  honest
information and won't panic as much as if it came from an outside source. This tendency, of a
smooth price decrease of share-price can be seen in British Petroleum case. The management
took bad prospectives in their own hands and publicly informed about firm's bad habits. They
faced the situation, where they already expected that the market value will go down sooner or
later,  and proffered to  voluntarily disclosure negative aspects  about  the company.  Market
response was noticeable but  not as violent  as it  would be in case if  the information was
coming from an external source.
Finally, we move on to the effects of disclosure of positive information. In this case it
is always better if the company is the source of news but it is not as crucial as in case of bad
news. As previously analysed, British Petroleum has a high level of voluntary disclosure. The
information does not only come from the company's management... many news come from
the press or other researchers. 
6. FINAL CONCLUSION
In  order  to  summarize  all  of  the  theoretical  and  practical  aspects  of  voluntary
disclosure, discussed in my paper I will present its pros and cons in the table.
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of voluntary disclosure of companies.
Advantages Disadvantages
 More complete view of company,
 Reduced information asymmetry,
 Fulfilled compulsory information,
 More frequent information,
 Lower cost of capital, 
 Prevents from hiding bad information
(from investor's perspective)
 Increased analysts coverage,
 Helps to reflect company's real value,
 Protects from undervaluation,
 Increased stock prices,
 Stronger fluidity of stocks
 In case of poor performance drop in
price of shares spread over time,
 Decreased uncertainty of investors 
 Increase  the  communication  with
stakeholders,
 Reflects management talent,
 Reduces contracting costs,
 Motivates for  better performance
 Improves business reporting
 Lowers  the  risk  of  misallocation  of
capital
 Improves investment decisions,
 Loose of competitive advantage,
 Need  of  continuity,  once  started  is
hard to stop,
 Increases  public's  expectations
regarding future disclosures,
 Bad information has to be shared,
 Penalisation for failure,
 Can be used against the management,
 Extra attention from stakeholders
 Increases  the  involvement  of
shareholders  and  might  lead  to
unnecessary conflicts,
 Could slow down the decision-making
process,
 Might lead to political attacks,
 The information can be false, nobody
controls it,
 Generates additional cost.
 More effective allocation of capital
As  we can  clearly  see  voluntary disclosure  has  its  advantages  and  disadvantages.
Depending of  what  the company is  disclosing it  will  result  either  in positive or negative
consequences. Some of the internal information will generate higher benefits if it is not shared
with outsiders. Regardless that fact, many times voluntary disclosure has increased company's
market value, decreased the cost of capital and helped to reflect its real value. Due to its
double nature, positive and negative effects, managers have to be really careful of what they
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